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Abstract: In early 2009 the Palestinian Authority submitted a declaration under Article 12(3) of 
the Rome Statute recognizing the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court ‘for the 
purpose of identifying, prosecuting and judging the authors and accomplices of acts committed 
on the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002.’ In the first instance this paper argues that whereas 
the existence or otherwise of a state of Palestine remains moot at best for the purpose of 
international law and international relations broadly speaking, a compelling argument can be 
made that for the purposes of the Statute only, a determination by the Court that Palestine is a 
state that can engage with the Court would be valid and in line with the Court and the Statute’s 
statutory requirements. The paper, drawing on the criteria being relied upon by the Office of the 
Prosecutor in order to decide whether the PA, as an institution established by the PLO, has the 
necessary ‘capacity’ to transfer its jurisdiction to the Court, then addresses the extent of the PA’s 
jurisdiction over international crimes. It demonstrates that the PA can legitimately prosecute 
individuals responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC regardless of the nationality 
of the individuals concerned and that the PA has the ability to enter into international 
agreements. It concludes by asserting that the ICC may validly consider Palestine to be a state 
for the purposes of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute and may accept the transfer of jurisdiction 
from the PA to the Court in line with the Statute and the principles of international law.    
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Background to the PA’s Declaration 
 
1. On 21 January 2009, Ali Al-Khashan, as Minister of Justice for the Government of 
Palestine, signed a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute recognizing the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court ‘for the purpose of identifying, 
prosecuting and judging the authors and accomplices of acts committed on the territory of 
Palestine since 1 July 2002.’ Article 12(3) allows a state that is not a party to the Statute 
to “accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court” by way of a declaration lodged with 
the registrar.
1
 The declaration was lodged with the Registrar of the Court on 22 January,
2
 
and in a statement acknowledging his meeting with Al-Khashan, the Court’s Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo stated that ‘These are complex legal issues to assess’.
3
 
 
2. The Palestinian approach to the ICC was in response to ‘Operation Cast Lead’, Israel’s 
military assault on Gaza which lasted from 27 December 2008 until 18 January 2009. 
According to Al-Haq’s research, 1409 Palestinians were killed during the assault. This 
figure includes 1172 civilians of whom 342 were children.
4
 The urgency of ensuring that 
those responsible for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity be held to 
account is paramount to a Palestinian community which can no longer tolerate the 
impunity which for so long has characterized Israel’s military assaults in the occupied 
Palestinian territory. 
 
3. On 9 January 2009 at the 9th special session of the Human Rights Council, convened to 
address “The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
including the recent aggression in the occupied Gaza Strip” a Resolution condemning 
Israel’s assault on Gaza
5
 and calling for an end to the occupation of all Palestinian lands 
occupied since 1967,
6
 decided “to dispatch an urgent, independent international fact-
finding mission, to be appointed by the President of the Council, to investigate all 
violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the 
occupying power, Israel, against the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current 
aggression”.
7
  
 
                                                
1
 Carsten Stahn, Mohamed M El Zeidy, Héctor Olásolo The International Criminal Court's Ad Hoc Jurisdiction 
Revisited 99 AJIL 2 (2005) 421-431. 
2
 Acknowledgment of receipt of Declaration by Registrar of ICC, 2009/404/SA/LASS, 23 January 2009.  
3
 OTP Statement 22 January 2009 Visit of the Minister of Justice of the Palestinian National Authority: available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/4F8D4963-EBE6-489D-9F6F-1B3C1057EA0A.htm. On 13 February Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno Ocampo met with Palestinian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Riad al Malki, and Minister of Justice, 
Mr Ali Khashan, as well as with the Palestinian National Authority Ambassador to The Netherlands, Mrs Somaia 
Albarghouti, in the ICC headquarters in The Hague. 
4
  Al Haq 'Operation Cast Lead': A Statistical Analysis August 2009, available at: http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/gaza-
operation-cast-Lead-statistical-analysis%20.pdf 
5
 Human Rights Council The grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly 
due to the recent Israeli military attacks  against the occupied Gaza Strip A/HRC/S-9/L.1 
12 January 2009, para 2. 
6
 Human Rights Council The grave violations Para 4. 
7
 Human Rights Council The grave violations Para 14. 
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4. Acting upon this Resolution, on 3 April 2009, the President of the Human Rights Council 
established the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict with the 
mandate “to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the 
military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 
2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.” The President appointed 
Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and 
former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, to head the Mission.
8
 
 
5. The Goldstone Report considered the alleged violations it investigated within the context 
of international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international human 
rights law. Published in September 2009, the Report concluded that “what occurred in 
just over three weeks at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 was a deliberately 
disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, 
radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and 
to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability”.
9
 The Report 
further asserted that “Whatever violations of international humanitarian and human rights 
law may have been committed, the systematic and deliberate nature of the activities 
described in this report leave the Mission in no doubt that responsibility lies in the first 
place with those who designed, planned, ordered and oversaw the operations.”
10
 
 
6. With its emphasis on the necessity of identifying those most responsible for the crimes 
committed in Gaza, the Goldstone Report stressed the role which the International 
Criminal Court should play in the international community’s responsibility for ensuring 
accountability for the victims of ‘Operation Cast Lead’. The Fact Finding Mission 
recommended that the United Nations Human Rights Council formally submit their 
report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
11
 and that in the absence of 
good faith investigations by the parties to the conflict, the UN Security Council, acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, should refer the situation in Gaza 
to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court pursuant to Article 13 (b) of the 
Rome Statute.
12
 To date, neither of these recommendations have been implemented. 
Addressing the Prosecutor of the ICC directly, the Report recommended that “With 
reference to the declaration under article 12 (3) received by the Office of the Prosecutor 
of the ICC from the Government of Palestine, the Mission considers that accountability 
                                                
8
 The other three appointed members were: Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to 
Beit Hanoun (2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a member of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence 
Forces and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations. Report of the 
United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009, para 2. 
9
 Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009, para 
1690. 
10
 Report of UN Fact-Finding Mission, para 1692. 
11
 Report of UN Fact-Finding Mission, para 1765. 
12
 Report of UN Fact-Finding Mission, para 1766. 
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for victims and the interests of peace and justice in the region require that the legal 
determination should be made by the Prosecutor as expeditiously as possible.”
13
 
 
7. Although Judge Goldstone was invited to speak on behalf of the Fact Finding Mission to 
the 12
th
 session of the Human Rights Council in September 2009, but on 1 October the 
Council decided to defer consideration of the Report. This was in response to the 
declared wishes of the PA, who, coming under serious political pressure from many 
states decided to withdraw its support for a Resolution endorsing the Report. This course 
of action was condemned immediately by human rights advocates and became a matter of 
significant public concern throughout the OPT and internationally. The popular call for 
an end to impunity saw the Human Rights Council reconvene on 15 & 16 October 2009 
for its 12
th
 special session, at which a Resolution endorsing the Goldstone Report was 
adopted.
14
 Just weeks later at the General Assembly a Resolution on the follow-up to the 
Report of the Fact Finding Mission was adopted by a majority vote, calling upon the 
parties to the conflict to conduct proper investigations, calling upon Switzerland to 
undertake the necessary steps as soon as possible to reconvene a Conference of High 
Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention on measures to enforce the 
Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and requesting the Secretary-General 
to report to the General Assembly, within a period of three months, on the 
implementation of the present resolution, with a view to considering further action.
15 
 
 
8. In the annual report of the International Criminal Court to the UN (dated 17 September 
2009), presented to the General Assembly by Judge Sang-Hyun Song, the President of 
the ICC, on 29 October 2009, the following commentary on action taken regards the 
Palestinian declaration is recorded: 
  
                                                
13
 Report of UN Fact-Finding Mission, para 1767. 
14
 HRC Res S-12/1. The human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 
A/HRC/RES/S-12/1, 21 October 2009. Adopted by a recorded vote of 25 to 6, with 11 abstentions. The voting was 
as follows: In favour: Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Ghana, 
India, Indonesia, Jordan, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia; Against: Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Ukraine, United States of 
America; Abstaining: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Japan, Mexico, Norway, 
Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Uruguay. 
15
 UNGA Res A/64/L.11 “Follow-up to the report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict”. Adopted by a recorded vote of 114 in favour to 18 against, with 44 abstentions, as follows: Against:  
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States 
of), Nauru, Netherlands, Palau, Panama, Poland, Slovakia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, 
United States. Abstain:  Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, 
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, 
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Spain, Swaziland, 
Sweden, Tonga, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay.  
See Al Haq’s response: Public letter to  Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Carl Bildt, Re: EU Position on 
respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law in the OPT, 12 November 2009, available at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/presidency_goldstone_12_nov_2009.pdf  
Public letter to Mr Maxime Verhagen Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Re: Dutch 
Position on respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law in the OPT, 12 November 2009, available at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/netherlands_goldstone_12_nov_2009.pdf  
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On 22 January 2009, the Palestinian National Authority lodged a declaration with 
the Registrar relating to article 12, paragraph 3, of the Rome Statute, which allows 
States not parties to the Statute to accept the Court’s jurisdiction. Owing to the 
uncertainties of the international community with respect to the existence or non-
existence of a State of Palestine, the Registrar accepted the declaration without 
prejudice to a judicial determination on the applicability of article 12, paragraph 
3. Between 28 December 2008 and 30 June 2009, the Office of the Prosecutor 
received 358 article 15 communications related to the situation of Israel and the 
Palestinian territories. The Office began to examine all issues related to its 
jurisdiction, including whether the declaration by the Palestinian Authority 
accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court meets statutory requirements, 
whether crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed and whether 
there are national proceedings in relation to alleged crimes. The Office received 
a number of communications, including the Report of the Independent Fact-
Finding Committee on Gaza: No Safe Place, which was presented to the League 
of Arab States on 30 April 2009 and which was sent to the Prosecutor by the 
Secretary-General of the League, Amre Moussa. The Palestinian National 
Authority indicated that it would send a supporting submission by September 
2009.
16
  
 
9. On 16 October 2009, shortly after the publication of the Goldstone Report, and while its 
passage through the Human Rights Council and General Assembly was headline news 
internationally, the Prosecutor of the ICC received a Palestinian delegation headed by Dr 
Ali Al-Khashan, Minister of Justice of the Palestinian National Authority, and which 
included the Palestinian Ambassador to the Netherlands, Nabil Abuznaid, and a team of 
legal experts including Vaughan Lowe QC, Professor of International Law at Oxford 
University. The Prosecutor also received members of the Independent Fact-finding 
Committee led by Professor John Dugard and members of the Arab League Secretariat, in 
the context of ongoing consultations concerning the declaration.
17
 Al-Khashan submitted 
documents concerning the declaration to the Prosecutor at this meeting.
18
 
 
 
Palestine can be Considered a State for the Purposes of Art 12(3) Rome Statute 
 
10. In The Hague, on 2-3 November 2009, Al-Haq participated in a meeting between 
representatives of the Court including the Office of the Prosecutor and Palestinian and 
international NGOs. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss various of the ‘complex 
legal issues’ arising from the Palestinian Declaration under Article 12(3) in January 2009 
and to provide the NGOs with a sense of how the ICC operates. The OTP stated that it is 
                                                
16
 Report of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2008/09, A/64/356, 17 September 2009, para 
51. Emphasis added. 
17
 Press Release: 16.10.2009; ICC Prosecutor receives Palestinian Minister of Justice, Arab League and Independent 
Fact-Finding Committee, ICC-OTP-20091016-PR465. 
18
 Ma’an News Agency Justice minister: PA prepping for ICC membership 17 October 2009 available at: 
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=232793 Despite some suggestion that the PA were seeking to 
become a state party to the Rome Statute, this has not been the case, with the Palestinians limiting their approach to 
the article 12(3) procedure. 
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still in the first stages of preliminary investigations regarding the submissions to the 
Court concerning ‘Operation Cast Lead’, and that the first question to be determined, 
before that of admissibility, is the question of jurisdiction ie whether the declaration by 
the Palestinian Authority accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court meets the 
necessary statutory requirements. 
 
11. Al-Haq’s investigations, and those of other NGOs, as well as the findings of the 
Goldstone Report, the OHCHR, the Independent Mission of the Arab League, and the 
Martin Report of the United Nations Board of Inquiry amongst others, have shown clear 
grounds to conclude that war crimes and crimes against humanity on a serious scale were 
committed by Israeli forces in Gaza, and by Palestinian armed groups launching rockets 
into southern Israel. Al-Haq has no doubt but that if the Court were to accept the 
declaration, then the evidence of international crimes committed in Gaza, along with the 
statements of the Israeli government and military to the effect that they will not be 
carrying out thorough investigations, should mean that questions of complementarity and 
gravity will not be any impediment to the initiation of ICC investigations and 
prosecutions.  
 
12. At first glance, the primary issue to be established when considering whether the ICC has 
the necessary jurisdiction to accept the Palestinian Declaration is whether Palestine can 
satisfy the requirement that it be a ‘state’ as considered by the Statute. . Article 12(3) of 
the Rome Statute under which the declaration was submitted, reads as follows: “If the 
acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, 
that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question.”
19
 Following submission 
of the declaration, Yigal Palmor, a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, dismissed 
the move as “a good propaganda stunt”, stating that since “The ICC charter is adhered to 
by sovereign states, and the Palestinian Authority has not yet been recognized as one, so 
it cannot be a member”.
20
 At the time of writing, senior figures in the Palestinian 
Authority and PLO have been making frequent statements regarding a unilateral 
declaration of Palestinian statehood, and their intention of requesting the UN Security 
Council to adopt a resolution recognizing such.
21
 While the EU has called such a move 
‘premature’,
22
 Hamas has opposed such initiatives on the basis that it is necessary first to 
end the occupation.
23
 It is difficult to discern whether the controversy is liable to have 
                                                
19
 Similarly, Article 4(2) of the Statute provides that “The Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided 
in this Statute, on the territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other State.” 
20
 Sebastian Rotella International Criminal Court to consider Gaza investigation Los Angeles Times 5 February 
2009, available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/05/world/fg-court-palestinians5. See also Daniel Benoliel  & 
Ronen Perry Israel, Palestine and the ICC Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1391963.   
21
 Ma’an News Abbas in Cairo: PA committed to seeking UN recognition 17 November 2009 available at: 
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=240591 & Ma’an News Russia courted by Israel, Palestine 5 
December 2009 available at: http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=244363 
22
 Ma’an News Erekat: It’s time to recognize a Palestinian state 17 November 2009 available at: 
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=240611  
23
 UPI Hamas rejects Palestinian statehood push 16 November 2009 available at: 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/International/2009/11/16/Hamas-rejects-Palestinian-statehood-push/UPI-
43461258375322/  
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significant effect for our purposes since Al-Haq’s position, as set forth below, is that 
Palestine can be considered a state for the purposes of the Rome Statute only.  
 
13. Responding to the Palestinian approach to the ICC, Professor John Quigley restated his 
opinion that Palestine should be regarded as a state relying upon the strong vote at the 
General Assembly in 1989 where a resolution was adopted acknowledging the 
proclamation of the state of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 
1988, and which decided that “the designation ‘Palestine’ should be used in place of the 
designation ‘Palestine Liberation Organization’ in the United Nations system.”
24
 One 
hundred and four states voted for this resolution, forty-four abstained; only the United 
States and Israel voted against. Quigley’s analysis draws on the Palestinians’ 
acknowledged right to self-determination and to an independent state in the OPT with 
East Jerusalem as its capital, and the principle that belligerent occupation in and of itself 
cannot affect the sovereignty that lies in the Palestinian people. He concludes that that 
since the breakup of the Ottoman empire, Palestine has been an international entity, 
denied for various reasons of the ability to practice the statehood which legitimately 
accrued to it, but which has nonetheless claimed to be a state, has been recognised as a 
state, and has acted to the best of its capacity, as a state.
25
 
 
14. Departing from the assumption that the Security Council would not refer the case of 
Palestine to the ICC as it has done previously with Darfur, former UN Special Rapporteur 
on human rights in the OPT John Dugard, writing in the New York Times in July 2009, 
suggested that since the Rome Statute fails to define a state, and as there is no 
international recognition board for aspirant states that it is not necessary for the 
Prosecutor: 
 
to decide that Palestine is a state for all purposes, but only for the purpose of the 
court. In so deciding, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo should not adopt a restrictive 
approach that emphasizes the absence of a fully effective government, but rather 
an expansive approach that gives effect to the main purpose of the I.C.C.
26
 
 
In support of such an expansive interpretation Dugard cited the wide recognition of 
Palestinian statehood and the fact that the Palestinian entity satisfactorily meets the 
traditional benchmarks of statehood, namely population, territory, government and ability 
to conduct international relations. He further referred to the well developed Palestinian 
                                                
24
 UNGA Res 43/177, UN GAOR, 43d Sess, UN Doc A/RES/43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988). 
25
 John Quigley The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue 35 Rutgers 
Law Record (2009) available at: http://www.lawrecord.com/files/35-rutgers-l-rec-1.pdf See also: Francis Boyle 
Creation of the State of Palestine 1 EJIL 301; James Crawford The creation of the State of Palestine: too much too 
soon? 1 EJIL (1990) 307; James Crawford, The creation of States in international law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006, 2
nd
 ed) 435-442; R Lapidoth & N Calvo-Goller Les éléments constitutives de l’État et la déclaration du 
Conseil National Palestinien du 15 novembre 1988 96 Revue générale du droit international public (1992) 777; John 
Quigley Palestine's Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and the Right of the Palestinians to Statehood 
7 BU Int’l LJ 1 (1989). CF Robert Weston Ash Is Palestine a “State”? A Response To Professor John Quigley’s 
Article, “The Palestine Declaration To The International Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue” 36 Rutgers Law 
Record (2009) available at: http://www.lawrecord.com/files/36-Rutgers-L-Rec-186.pdf  
26
 John Dugard Take the Case New York Times 22 July 2009, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/opinion/23iht-eddugard.html  
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judicial system, before concluding that since the purpose of the Rome Statute, as 
proclaimed in its preamble, is to punish those who commit international crimes and to 
prevent impunity, when “an entity claiming to be a state, and recognized as such by a 
majority of states, makes a declaration under the I.C.C. statute that seeks to give effect to 
such goals, the I.C.C. should accept it as a state for the purpose of the I.C.C. statute.”
27
 
 
15. Both Professors Dugard and Quigley cited past practice to demonstrate that the 
international community has recognized statehood through admittance to the UN in cases 
where the government of the state in question has been particularly weak, such as some 
African states emerging from colonialism for whom statehood meant the promotion of 
self-determination, or as with Bosnia-Herzegovina, which when admitted in 1992 was in 
the throes of a civil war, and where recognition of statehood was considered a means of 
promoting international peace and security. It may also be pertinent to the immediate 
issue that Article 93(2) of the UN Charter makes provision for states who are non-
members of the United Nations to become parties to the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice. Prior to becoming Members of the UN, Japan, Liechtenstein, San Marino, 
Nauru and Switzerland were parties to the Statute of the Court.
28
 
 
16. In the light of such considerations, and accepting that the existence or otherwise of a state 
of Palestine remains moot at best, attention must be given to the question of how a state 
may be understood for the purposes of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, and whether 
this may be different from the practice generally accepted under international law and 
international relations.  
 
17. Since the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002 there have been several notable 
developments regarding its policy and practice that had not been countenanced during its 
drafting but which have been followed in order to give effect to its mandate as set forth in 
the Preamble. The most significant, and one which received much of its impetus from the 
OTP, has possibly been the self-referrals from Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and the Central African Republic each of which have led to the initiation of cases 
before the Court.
29
  
 
18. A further development of note is that of the Security Council’s referral of the situation in 
Darfur to the ICC on 31 March 2005, acting on the recommendation of the Report of the 
                                                
27
 John Dugard Take the Case New York Times 22 July 2009, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/opinion/23iht-eddugard.html 
28
 As from 2 April 1954, 29 March 1950, 18 February 1954, 29 January 1988 and 28 July 1948 respectively. See: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&sp3=b. The General Assembly Resolution on the Definition 
of Aggression likewise adopted an expansive notion of what it meant to be a state for the purposes of the Definition.  
Article 1 includes an explanatory note which provides that in the Definition of Aggression, the term ‘state’, “(a) Is 
used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a a member of the United Nations; (b) 
Includes the concept of a “group of States” where appropriate.” Definition of Aggression UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) 
(1974). Considering the facts re Indonesia’s military annexation of East Timor in 1976, Julius Stone found the 
explanatory note unhelpful since “it remains most obscure and debatable, even with Explanatory Note (a), whether 
and in what sense the definition is limited to state-to-state aggression.” Julius Stone Hopes and Loopholes in the 
1974 Definition of Aggression 71 AJIL 224- 246 (1977) 231-3.  
29
 William A Schabas ‘Complementarity In Practice’: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts 19 Crim LF 5 (2008) 7. 
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International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
30
 which had been established by the UN 
Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564. In Resolution 1593 
(2005) the Security Council , acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and “Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security”, decided to refer the situation in Darfur since 1 July 
2002 to the Prosecutor of the ICC. This was the first and only time the Security Council 
has referred a case of a non-state party, and while this mechanism is explicitly provided 
for in Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, it highlights the possibility that the Court and its 
mechanisms have a central role not just in ensuring post-war accountability, but in 
influencing:  
 
armed conflicts by stigmatizing those who are most responsible for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide, while the conflict is still going on. This 
approach will mostly target political and military leaders, which is likely to 
produce considerable effects on the character of the respective conflict.
31
  
 
Similarly, the first declaration under Article 12(3) was lodged by Ivory Coast, a state that 
is not party to the Statute but which suffers from civil strife and internal conflict.
32
 
 
19. What is of particular import with regards the Security Council referral of 2005 is that it 
does not pertain to crimes committed anywhere in the state of Sudan, but rather to crimes 
that were committed in the region of Darfur, namely the Sudanese states of North Darfur, 
South Darfur, and West Darfur.
33
 The Prosecutor is therefore barred from investigating 
crimes committed in any other of Sudan’s 23 regional states since the ICC has no 
jurisdiction there. This demonstrates that the Statute, as well as the Security Council, 
does not consider the sovereign state as being the absolute and only unit of territory over 
which the Court may have jurisdiction. Alternatively, since the crimes set forth in the 
Statute ‘threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world’,
34
 the Court may hold 
jurisdiction over a geographical area other than the state, including within a state, or an 
area falling within two or more states. This is in keeping with Condorelli & Villalpando’s 
observation that in general, the Security Council: 
 
enjoys a wide discretion, based on its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, in 
determining and delimiting the ‘situation’ to be referred to the Court. Thus the 
Security Council could refer in broad terms to a situation ongoing in a particular 
geographical zone, or it could identify more specifically the crimes that appear to 
have been committed and their authors.
35
 
                                                
30
 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Geneva, 25 
January 2005, para 584, available at: http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf  
31
 Philipp Kastner The ICC in Darfur-Savior or Spoiler? 14 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 146 (2007-2008) 154. 
32
 Carsten Stahn, Mohamed M El Zeidy, Héctor Olásolo The International Criminal Court's Ad Hoc Jurisdiction 
Revisited 99 AJIL 2 (2005) 422. 
33
 Matthias Neuener The Darfur Referral of the Security Council and the Scope of the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court 8 YB IHL (2005) 328. 
34
 Statute, Preamble para 3. 
35
 Luigi Condorelli and Santiago Villapando Referral and Deferral by the Security Council in Cassese, Gaeta, Jones 
(eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Vol I (NY, OUP: 2001) 633. 
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20. The Court has not been long in existence but it is clear from the cited examples that past 
precedent suggests a tendency to interpret the mechanisms of the Rome Statute 
expansively, while respectful of the rule of law, and in a manner which prefers fulfilment 
of the aims of the Statute over a narrow and unduly legalistic reading of international 
criminal law. It would be contrary to the purposes set forth in the Statute’s Preamble to 
exclude from the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction a geographical zone in which war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are perpetrated, on the sole premise that it is not 
generally recognized either as constituting a state, or a part of any state. Given the 
Preamble’s affirmation “that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must 
be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international 
cooperation” and its determination “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”, it is not unreasonable, 
indeed, it must be expected, that in interpreting the meaning of ‘state’ for the purposes of 
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, an expansive approach, divorced from the political 
considerations which otherwise tend to guide state recognition, and rooted firmly in the 
principles and purposes of the UN Charter, must be followed. 
 
 
The Jurisdictional Capacity of the PA 
 
21. Accepting therefore that the meaning of a state for the purposes of the Rome Statute may 
legitimately differ from the definition of a state for international law more generally, we 
must consider what criteria the OTP can apply in making such a determination. At the 
November NGO meeting in The Hague, it was confirmed that a determination as to 
whether “the declaration by the Palestinian Authority accepting the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the Court meets statutory requirements”
36
 would not be decided on the 
question of whether Palestine was generally recognized as a state, but rather on the basis 
of whether the Palestinian Authority could satisfy the requirements of the Statute by 
demonstrating that they possess adequate ‘government “capacity”’ to transfer jurisdiction 
to the Court.
37
 
 
22. It would therefore appear that the OTP will not make a determination on the basis of the 
existence or non-existence of a state of Palestine, but rather on the basis of whether the 
Palestinian entity, could be considered a state solely for the purposes of Article 12(3) of 
the Rome Statute. So far as Al-Haq is aware, the October document submitted by the 
Palestinians
38
 provided an opinion on three questions placed by the OTP with the 
requirement that they be convincingly answered in the positive in order that the 
declaration can be considered as satisfying the statutory requirements. These questions, 
the final two of which are closely related, are: 
                                                
36
 Report of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2008/09, A/64/356, 17 September 2009, para 
51. 
37
 Minutes of Meeting with Al Haq and other NGOs November 2009, with Al Haq. 
38
 Press Release: 16.10.2009; ICC Prosecutor receives Palestinian Minister of Justice, Arab League and Independent 
Fact-Finding Committee, ICC-OTP-20091016-PR465. 
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1. Does the PA have the capacity to enter into international agreements?  
2. Does the PA have the capacity to try Palestinians on criminal charges?  
3. Does the PA have the capacity to try Israeli citizens on criminal charges? 
 
23. What is clear from the substance of these questions is that if the answer to each is in the 
affirmative, the Prosecutor will act under the assumption that the PA therefore has the 
capacity to transfer such cases to the Court. This is in keeping with the purpose of the 
Court as an “international jurisdictional safety net”
39
 which starts to work when national 
jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to deal with the crimes committed. What is left 
unaddressed in this approach is the question of territory and the territorial scope of PA 
jurisdiction in the OPT. The Palestinian declaration was not limited to a particular crime 
but accepted ICC jurisdiction over any crimes committed in Palestine from the date on 
which the ICC Statute entered into force, 1 July 2002. The declaration did not further 
identify the “territory of Palestine” but such territory would presumably include Gaza and 
the West Bank including East Jerusalem, ie all the territory occupied by Israel in 1967 
over which the Palestinians have a recognized right to self-determination. Israel and the 
PLO have agreed that the West Bank and Gaza Strip form ‘a single territorial unit’ whose 
integrity is to be preserved pending the conclusion of permanent status negotiations.
40
 
The UN General Assembly, in a resolution condemning the territorial fragmentation of 
the West Bank by the construction of the Wall, stressed ‘the need for respect for and 
preservation of the territorial unity, contiguity and integrity of all of the OPT, including 
East Jerusalem.’
41
 Similarly, following ‘Operation Cast Lead’, the Security Council 
stressed that the Gaza Strip constitutes an ‘integral part’ of the self-determination unit 
comprised of the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967.
42
  
 
24.  While the Court will have to delimit a particular territory over which it has jurisdiction in 
the case of accepting the Palestinian declaration, such a determination will not be of 
prejudice to the final status negotiations between Israel, the Palestinians, and the 
international community. Territorial delimitation by the Court should be regarded as 
strictly for the purposes of the investigation of the situation only and not as indicative of 
the borders of a Palestinian state for any broader purposes. As noted above, the Statute’s 
Preamble asserts the main function of the Court to be that of combating impunity, of 
ensuring accountability for the Crimes within its jurisdiction. Given that individual 
criminal responsibility lies at the core of the Court’s work, it is not necessary that the 
Court determine any state’s final and comprehensive borders, but that it delimit a 
territorial zone in as broad a sense as it deems necessary and possible, while respecting 
third states’ sovereignty, in order to conduct full investigations into the alleged crimes. 
Al-Haq would recommend that the Court in this instance would hold its territorial 
jurisdiction in case of acceptance of the PA declaration as applying to the OPT as a 
                                                
39
 M Cherif Bassiouni The 1CC-Quo Vadis? 4 J Int’l Crim J 421 (2006) 422. 
40
 See the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Article IV; and the 1995 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Article XI.1. For commentary, see Raja 
Shehadeh From occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian Territories (London: Kluwer, 1997) 35-
37. 
41
 UN General Assembly Resolution 62/146, 18 December 2007. 
42
 UN Security Council Resolution 1860, 8 January 2009. 
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whole. This would be in keeping with the international community’s consistent position 
that the West Bank including East Jerusalem and Gaza represent a single unit and 
respectful of the Palestinian right to self-determination and territorial integrity.
43
  
 
 
Q.1: Does the PA have the capacity to enter into international agreements?  
 
25. Key to the question of whether the PA has the capacity to enter into international 
agreements, is the nature of its relationship with the PLO.
44
 The Oslo Accords ‘reflect the 
existence of two Palestinian entities, one (the PLO) with the power to engage in foreign 
relations but not to control territory, and the other (the PA) with the power to control and 
govern territory but not to engage in foreign relations.’
45
 While this restriction of the 
PA’s capacity to enter into international agreements will be considered in the next 
paragraph, it is essential to first emphasize here that there can be no doubt regarding the 
PLO’s ability to enter into international agreements. The PLO, in its internationally-
recognized capacity as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,
46
 has not 
only entered into agreements with the Arab League, it has also entered into a number of 
binding bilateral international agreements, mostly with Arab States, but also, for instance, 
with the United States, as early as one year after Oslo I.
47
 Moreover, the Oslo Accords 
themselves are binding international agreements between the State of Israel and the PLO, 
as a “subject of international law”.
48
  
 
26. The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II) specifically 
excluded certain aspects of foreign relations from the authority of the PA. Oslo II 
provides that the PA ‘will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign 
relations’, such as the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of 
                                                
43
 An alternative option would be to accept a Palestinian state for the purposes of the Statute but to limit the 
‘situation’ and the scope of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, to the Gaza Strip only, following the approach the 
Security Council previously took regarding Darfur. Unlike in the West Bank, the Gazan border is of far less 
controversy for the purpose of final status negotiations between Israel and the PA, with all parties essentially in 
agreement on where the border lies. To restrict the situation to Gaza only would allow the Court to investigate the 
core crimes set out in the Goldstone Report while avoiding having to become involved in making any form of 
determination as to the possible or probable borders of a Palestinian state. This would however exclude from the 
Court’s jurisdiction those crimes committed in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank since July 2002. 
44
 The Accords created a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority styled ‘the Council’ in the agreement but 
generally called the Palestinian Authority (PA) that was to hold executive, legislative, and judicial authority. 
Chapter 3, Article XVII (3), The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, September 1995, 36 
International Legal Materials 551 (1995). 
45
 Geoffrey Watson The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements (Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 245. 
46
 See for example, GA Res 158, UN GAOR, 48th Sess, Supp NO 35, at 1, 5, UN Doc A/RES/48/158 (1994).  
47
 See, Watson The Oslo Accords 98-99. Arguing that the “Agreement on Encouragement of Investment Between 
the United States of America and the Palestine Liberation Organisation for the Benefit of the Palestinian Authority 
Persuant to the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area” (11 Aug and 12 Sept 1994; State Dep. No. 94-
233, KAV 4032) was ‘strongly suggesting that both parties believed the Agreement was a legally binding 
international agreement’, as Article 6 of the Agreement provides: ‘This Agreement shall enter into force when 
signed by both Parties’.      
48
 Watson The Oslo Accords 91-102; John Quigley The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are they Treaties? 30 
Cornell Int’l L J 717 (1997) 740. 
© Al-Haq 2009                                                                                                                       13  
foreign missions or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. 
The PLO on the other hand, may conduct negotiations and sign economic agreements as 
well as cultural, scientific and educational agreements with states or international 
organizations ‘for the benefit’ of the PA.
49
 The phrase ‘for the benefit’ was apparently 
chosen by Israel to avoid suggestion that the PLO was merely the agent or foreign-policy 
branch of the PA and to keep claims of Palestinian statehood, through the PA, at bay.
50
 
But this PLO-PA ‘division of labour’ with regards to foreign relations seems difficult to 
enforce given the overlap between the two organizations.
51
 Since the Oslo Accords the 
distinction has been exponentially blurred in practice, and the reality is that the PA has 
entered into various agreements with international organizations and states. It has been 
noted by Israeli officials that: (1) the PLO representative in Egypt is designated as a PA 
official, in violation of Article IX(5)(a) of Oslo II; (2) that a PLO representative signed a 
protocol on security cooperation with Russia in the name of the PA, despite security 
cooperation arrangements not being listed in the various categories of international 
agreements which the PLO is permitted to sign for the PA under Article IX (5)(b), and; 
(3) the PA joined the International Airport Council as the PA,52 also in apparent violation 
or disregard for Article IX (5)(b).
53
 More than violations of a treaty, these instances of 
foreign relations undertaken by the PA also signify that the Interim Agreement is part of 
a larger ongoing peace process, and that the restrictions on the foreign policy operations 
of the PA conflict with the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination, now a norm with a nature of jus cogens,54 which includes a right to 
engage in international relations with other peoples.
55
   
 
27. The reality is indeed that the capacity and ability of the PLO and PA, to engage in foreign 
relations has consistently been recognised and interpreted broadly in practice. The EU’s 
reading of the Interim Agreement for instance allows the Palestinians, through the PLO to 
sign their own trade agreements with third parties (countries or entities), while Israel 
claims that the Agreement allows only economic cooperation agreements, not 
independent trade agreements.
56
 The EU considers the PA evolved enough to disregard 
                                                
49
 The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 28 September 1995, art. 
IX 5(a) and 5(b). 
50
 Watson The Oslo Accords 245; The capacity to enter into relations with other states is one of the four traditional 
requirements for statehood. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec 26, 1933, 165 LNTS 19, 
art. I.  
51
 Watson The Oslo Accords 245. 
52
 Available at: http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_content07_c.jsp?zn=aci&cp=1-2-
11^9527_666_2_/members_liste 
53
 Middle East Peace Process: Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 
104th Congress, First Session, 20 September 1995, at 288-289. Available at: 
http://ia311229.us.archive.org/3/items/middleeastpeacep00unit/middleeastpeacep00unit.pdf; Sanford R. Silverberg 
Diplomatic Recognition of States in Statu Nascendi: The Case of Palestine 6 Tulsa J Comp & Int’l L 21 (1998) 39-
40. 
54
 Antonio Cassese International Law (Oxford, 2nd ed 2005) 65; Martin Dixon International Law (Oxford, 6th ed 
2007) 164. 
55
 Watson The Oslo Accords 245. 
56
 Marshall J Breger & Shelby R Quast International Commercial Arbitration: A Case Study of the Areas Under 
Control of the Palestinian Authority 32 Case Western Reserve J Int’l L 185 (2000) 241; Reading the EU, The 
Jerusalem Post, May 22, 1998, 16.  
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many of the Interim Agreement restrictions regarding its capacity to enter foreign 
relations. The Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and 
cooperation was signed between the European Community and the PLO (on behalf of the 
PA) in 1997.
57
 On 20 April 2005, the European Union Coordinating Office for 
Palestinian Police Support was formally established by an exchange of letters between 
the Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei and the EU Special Representative to the 
Middle East Peace Process Marc Otte, and it was on the explicit written invitation of the 
PA that the Council of the European Union established the EU Police Mission in the 
Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) in November of the same year under the 
European Security and Defence Policy.
58
 The PA is now also seeking observer status at 
the World Trade Organization, ‘as a preparation for statehood’.
59
 
  
28. In summary, while it is the PA that has submitted the declaration to the ICC, it remains a 
body that is subsidiary to the PLO. In this respect while the PLO enjoys observer status at 
the UN, and has the power to dissolve the PA, when acting in the international arena the 
PA is implicitly acting on behalf of the PLO. Under Oslo the PA’s ability to undertake 
foreign relations and to enter into international agreements (through the PLO) is limited 
to the spheres of economics, culture, science and education with states and international 
organizations, while the PLO is the body that can enter into international agreements 
proper. Nonetheless, state practice over the past decade has demonstrated that the limits 
placed on the PA in this regard by Oslo are no longer recognised or considered legitimate 
by the international community and as such the question whether the PA presently has the 
ability to enter into international agreements can only be answered positively. 
 
 
Q.2: Does the PA have the capacity to try Palestinians on criminal charges?  
 
29. Similarly with the second question, there is no doubt that the Palestinian Authority 
presently has the capacity to try Palestinians on criminal charges at the national level. In 
the Pre-Oslo era, the Local Courts serving the Palestinians in the West Bank were 
usurped of many of their powers: Jewish settlers were not subject to the jurisdiction of 
these courts and neither could the activities of the Israeli military be reviewed.
60
 Whereas 
the Israeli authorities seriously undermined the independence of the West Bank judicial 
system guaranteed under Jordanian law,
61
 the Military Courts established in the West 
Bank also gradually expanded their jurisdiction at the expense of the Local Courts, and 
cases involving traffic and drug offences were tried, as well as cases of murder and other 
serious crimes committed by Palestinians against other Palestinians.
62
   
                                                
57
 Official Journal of the European Communities, 16.7.97, No L 187/3. 
58
 Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 on the European Union Police Mission for the 
Palestinian Territories. 
59
 John Zarocostas Palestinian Seek Observer Status at WTO The Washington Post, 27 September 2009. (quoting 
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60
 Raja Shehadeh Occupier’s Law: Israel and the West Bank (Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington DC, 1985) 
76. 
61
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62
 Shehadeh Occupier’s Law 85. 
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30. In the 1990s, the Oslo Accords restored to a certain extent Palestinian civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza. With regards to criminal jurisdiction, Oslo II 
clearly states that the criminal jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority covers all offences 
committed by Palestinians and/or non-Israelis in the Gaza Strip and Areas A and B of the 
West Bank as defined by the Agreement, excluding the settlements and military locations 
there.
63
 As such, Israel retained sole criminal jurisdiction over offences committed by 
Israelis.
64
 In Area C of the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority has criminal jurisdiction 
under Oslo II over Palestinians and non-Israelis who have committed offences “against 
Palestinians or their visitors”, provided that these offences are “not related to Israel’s 
security interests”.
65
 Beyond these security-related limitations, the general thrust of the 
Accords is clear, and as such these limitations can cast no doubt over the general capacity 
of the PA to try Palestinians on criminal charges at the national level.      
 
 
Q.3: Does the PA have the capacity to try Israeli citizens on criminal charges? 
 
31. A prima facie response to this question would be to acknowledge that the 500,000 or so 
Israeli citizens residing in the OPT in settlements are excluded from PA jurisdiction as a 
result of the Oslo Accords and therefore the Palestinian legal system has no jurisdiction, 
civil or criminal, over any Israeli citizens.
66
 Under Oslo Israel retained exclusive personal 
jurisdiction in criminal matters over Israelis, including offences committed in Areas A 
and B, as well as C.
67
 Article XVII (1) of the Interim Agreement provided that the PA 
would have jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory as a single territorial 
unit, but excluded in para (a) “issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status 
negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, 
borders, foreign relations and Israelis”, subsequently confirming at para (c), that  “The 
territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all persons, except for 
Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.”
68
 
                                                
63
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September 1995, art. I 1(a).  
64
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65
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32. On this basis it would appear that the capacity required by the OTP in order for the PA to 
submit a valid declaration is not satisfied since Israelis responsible for criminal acts in the 
occupied Palestinian territories do not fall under PA jurisdiction. Al-Haq believe that in 
order to overcome this prima facie obstacle, the PA submission to the OTP argued that in 
concluding an interim, that is, a temporary agreement with Israel to exclude Israelis from 
the scope of their criminal jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza, the PA temporarily 
waived an inherent right which as the bearers of the right to self-determination and to an 
independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, they continue to hold. Such a waiver was 
conceived of along with many other compromises – such as the continued presence of the 
settlements – not as acceptance of any Israeli claim or otherwise but as part of a bona fide 
effort to secure an end to the conflict and to see two states living side by side. By this 
reckoning, the current situation vis-à-vis PA jurisdiction over Israelis may be reversed 
should they choose to unilaterally withdraw from the Accords. This latent capacity to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over any individual within their control is of course 
theoretical, since due to the occupation, should the PA attempt to put such a course of 
action into practice by detaining or prosecuting an Israeli they would be liable to 
immediate and overwhelming military assault.
69
  
 
33. Al-Haq would suggest that an additional, more persuasive argument can be made to 
establish the requisite levels of capacity, by reference to the customary nature of the 
grave breaches regime of international humanitarian law. Specifically, crimes over which 
the ICC has jurisdiction, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide are crimes under customary international law, and many 
are widely recognised as being subject to universal jurisdiction. There is an obligation 
upon all states to enact effective penal sanctions in domestic law and an obligation to 
search for and to try or extradite persons suspected of grave breaches on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator. With 194 states 
parties, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the grave breaches regime, as confirmed in 
1996 by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons, form part of customary international law.
70
 With respect to the principle 
of aut dedere aut iudicare, Jean-Marie Henckaerts has correctly observed that: 
 
the obligation to search and try or extradite persons suspected of grave breaches is 
not a purely technical aspect of the Geneva Conventions. It is submitted that [it] is 
fundamental for the protection of the human person and, as such, has become part 
of customary international law through extensive and virtually uniform practice, 
including universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions. It is also inherent in 
the recognition of the grave breaches as crimes under international law that states 
must act to ensure that suspects do not enjoy impunity.
71
  
                                                
69
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At this point it is worth noting Palestinian intentions to be bound by the Geneva 
Conventions. In June 1989, the PLO submitted to the Government of Switzerland 
ratification documents for the Geneva Conventions but the Swiss refrained from deciding 
upon the validity or otherwise of such a ratification on the grounds that it was “not in a 
position to decide whether this communication can be considered as an instrument of 
accession in the sense of the relevant provisions of the Conventions and their additional 
Protocols.”
72
 
 
34. The grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions documented in the Goldstone Report are 
alleged to constitute war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity. The General 
Assembly resolution that endorsed the Report, urged: 
 
in line with the recommendation of the Fact-Finding Mission, the undertaking by 
the Palestinian side, within a period of three months, of investigations that are 
independent, credible and in conformity with international standards into the 
serious violations of international humanitarian and international human rights 
law reported by the Fact-Finding Mission, towards ensuring accountability and 
justice.
73
 
 
This represents an acknowledgement by the international community that, whether there 
exists a Palestinian state or not, ‘the Palestinian side’ not only has the ability to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes but also that it has the duty to do so. Such 
investigations, to be in conformity with international standards must be directed against 
all those responsible for the alleged crimes and not discriminate on grounds of 
nationality. Article 146(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention is explicit in stating that 
each High Contracting Party “shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged 
to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall 
bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts”.74 
 
35. It is clear from the language and tone of the Goldstone Report itself, as well as from the 
deliberations at the United Nations, that the primary expectation of the international 
community is that Palestinians and Israel would focus their investigations on individuals 
within their own political, legal, and military structures. It is impermissible however to 
create distinctions on the grounds of nationality in the duty to investigate and prosecute 
any individual allegedly responsible for grave breaches.  
 
36. The exclusion of Israelis from PA jurisdiction as provided for in the Interim Agreement 
cannot legitimately be considered as extending to the international crimes of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity as to do so would be incompatible with international law. 
As an entity acknowledged by the international community as having both the capacity 
and responsibility for investigating and prosecuting serious violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law the PA must therefore be acknowledged as having the 
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capacity and responsibility for investigating Israelis suspected of being responsible for 
such actions. This must be so even if given the realities of the occupation, the threat of 
Israeli military force being used in response to any efforts by the Palestinians in this 
regard renders it a practical impossibility. Similarly, despite the disjoint between the 
political leadership in Gaza where Hamas are the acting government, and in the West 
Bank where Fatah are the acting government, both parties continue to support the PA as 
an institution whose jurisdiction continues to extend to both the West Bank and to Gaza. 
On this basis, internal political differences, subject to ongoing unity negotiations cannot 
be held as denying the PA’s jurisdiction in all of the OPT. 
 
37. Furthermore, international humanitarian law recognises that protected persons, those 
‘who at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in cases of a 
conflict or occupation in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of 
which they are not nationals’,
75
 could come under immense pressure to forfeit the 
protections guaranteed them under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The drafters, 
conscious of the experience during the Second World War when national governments 
struck agreements with occupying powers that were ‘represented to those concerned as an 
advantage, but in the majority of cases involved drawbacks which were sometimes very 
serious’,
76
 addressed this potentiality in Article 8 which asserts that: 
 
protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the 
rights secured to them by the present Convention and by the special agreements 
referred to in the foregoing Article. 
 
The drafters also wanted to ensure that states could not take ‘refuge behind the will of the 
protected persons’ to justify their failure to comply with the provisions of the 
Convention. In this spirit, the drafters further emphasised the ‘cardinal importance’
77
 of 
the non-derogability of the Convention’s protections, and Article 47 states: 
 
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case 
or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any 
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the 
institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded 
between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor 
by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory. 
 
38. In sum, Articles 8 and 47 affirm that belligerents cannot conclude agreements which 
derogate from or deny to protected persons the safeguards of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. Nor can any renunciation of rights by protected persons have legal effect. 
On this basis it cannot be countenanced in law that the Interim Agreement can be 
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regarded as having excluded from the jurisdiction of the PA, the obligation set forth in 
Article 146 (2) to prosecute any individual allegedly responsible for grave breaches. 
 
 
Summary 
 
39. The international community, represented by the United Nations, bears a special 
responsibility in respect to Palestine, initially as a result of the Mandate and the Partition 
Resolution, but also through the role it has assumed with the Quartet, and especially as 
the trustee of the international legal framework for the protection and promotion of 
human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security. This responsibility 
has been described by the General Assembly as “a permanent responsibility […] until the 
question is resolved in all its aspects in a satisfactory manner in accordance with 
international legitimacy.”
78
  The need to confront impunity for the crimes detailed in the 
Goldstone Report amongst others demands that international law be brought to bear in 
ensuring accountability for the victims of international crimes, as well as in bringing an 
end to the occupation.  
 
40. By accepting the PA’s declaration as valid, the ICC will not be undermining the statist 
foundations of international law. To the contrary, the PA is in many respects operating as 
a state, is being held to international legal obligations typically binding upon states, and 
has an internationally recognised aspiration to full statehood. Due to the occupation this 
aspiration continues to be frustrated and clear arguments have been made to the extent 
that in light of Israel’s policies and practices in the OPT which can be considered as 
constituting violations of international law’s prohibitions of apartheid and colonialism, 
combined with the prolonged nature of the occupation, the unlawful annexation to Israel 
of East Jerusalem, the illegality of the construction of the Wall, and the manifold 
violations by the occupying forces of the international humanitarian and human rights 
law, the occupation itself should be considered unlawful.
79
 While we await an 
authoritative finding to this effect, it remains the case that the international community 
abhors the situation of prolonged occupation and supports the Palestinian aspiration to 
statehood. Furthermore, other than the Palestinians themselves, no other state except for 
the belligerent occupier Israel, maintains any form or claim of sovereignty over the 
territory of the occupied West Bank and Gaza. To deny Palestinians recourse to 
international law and justice on the basis of their being subject to Israeli military 
occupation would be contrary to the spirit of international law. 
 
41. In considering whether international law (and the international community) should 
engage non-state armed groups, thereby “giving them inevitably a certain international 
standing (but with the advantage of being able to require them to comply with certain 
international standards)” or whether they should simply be ignored, Sassòli compellingly 
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argues that indeed such actors should be engaged with by international law and its 
mechanisms.
80
 This is truly the only viable course of action with regards the entity of 
Palestine which is far more developed and structured than what is typically considered 
within the ambit of ‘non-state actors’. International reality is less and less state-centric, 
and as the PA is an important international player it cannot be non-existent for 
international law. In this respect it is salient to note that the PA initiated the GA 
Resolution which submitted the question on the legal consequences of Israel’s 
construction of the Wall in the OPT,
81
 and participated in the proceedings.
82
 In the Wall 
advisory opinion, the ICJ treated Palestine’s statehood as having not yet been established, 
noting that the Court itself had the duty: 
 
to draw the attention of the General Assembly, to which the present Opinion is 
addressed, to the need for these efforts to be encouraged with a view to achieving 
as soon as possible, on the basis of international law, a negotiated solution to the 
outstanding problems and the establishment of a Palestinian State, existing side by 
side with Israel and its other neighbours, with peace and security for all in the 
region.
83
 
 
This is in keeping with the ICJ’s repeated emphasis of the significance of the right to self-
determination, which it has held as being “one of the essential principles of contemporary 
international law”,
84
 and in the Wall AO, the ICJ affirmed that self-determination is a 
right erga omnes, whose realisation all UN member States, as well as all states parties to 
the international covenants on human rights, have the duty to promote.
85
 While it has 
been demonstrated that it is open to the Court to investigate a geographical region 
regardless of state or other territorial boundaries, the context in which the Palestinian 
declaration is made, that of an occupation in which the protected Palestinian people, are 
as a whole, unprotected, and reliant on the international community to facilitate their self-
determination, and also considering that the Goldstone Report investigated grave 
breaches in both the West Bank and Gaza, we would submit that any investigation by the 
Court must extend to the entirety of the occupied Palestinian territory. 
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42. The Rome Statute’s preamble asserts “that it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes” and emphasizes 
“that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”. The PA also shares this duty to 
exercise its national criminal jurisdiction in such a manner, and to act in accordance with 
international law, and therefore should be recognized as a state for the purposes of Article 
12(3) of the Rome Statute. In accepting the declaration the Court will be promoting the 
principles and purposes of the UN by ensuring that no-one is excluded from the writ of 
international justice nor from the protection of international law.  
 
43. Relying on the above analysis, our examination concludes that a cumulative set of 
findings makes a clear case, in law and in policy, for the declaration to be valid: 
 
a. The existence of a state of Palestine, although controversial, is nonetheless a 
reality in the opinions of many states. 
b. The PA satisfies many of the basic criteria of statehood and effects many of the 
duties and responsibilities of states. 
c. The Palestinians have an internationally recognised right to self-determination 
and to an independent state. 
d. The Palestinians in the OPT are living under a foreign military occupation which 
is frustrating their ability to effectively exercise their right to self-determination 
through an independent state. 
e. The PA has the ability to enter into international agreements. 
f. The PA has the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Palestinians and 
other non-nationals. 
g. The PA as a party bound by customary international law to investigate and 
prosecute grave breaches of international humanitarian law has the duty to 
prosecute anyone alleged to have committed such crimes, a duty which cannot 
discriminate on grounds of nationality, and which therefore brings Israeli 
nationals within the scope of PA jurisdiction. 
h. The ICC may decide what constitutes a state for the purposes of the Rome Statute 
by criteria different from what is used for other purposes in international relations 
and international law. 
i. For the purposes of the Rome Statute, Palestine can legitimately considered to be 
a state with the capacity to submit a valid Art 12(3) declaration. 
 
Given the PA’s ability to enter into international agreements, its jurisdictional capacity, 
and duty, to prosecute Palestinians, Israelis, and other nationalities for international 
crimes, and the ICC’s competence to interpret the meaning of ‘state’ for the purposes of 
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, then there can be no doubt but that the declaration by 
the Palestinian Authority accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court meets 
statutory requirements. 
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Conclusion 
 
44. The questions posed to the PA by the OTP should not be considered as the only possible 
grounds by which the Court can make a decision as to the validity of the PA’s 
Declaration, but since they are the grounds that have been proposed, and on which 
proceedings are reliant, the necessity of their being answered in the positive is crucial for 
the PA application to succeed. That the OTP may decide subsequently not to investigate 
alleged crimes committed on Palestinian territory on grounds of complementarity or 
gravity is a matter for another day. That the Prosecutor may decide not to make any 
decision is also another matter. What is clear at this point is that the questions posed by 
the OTP can all be convincingly answered in the positive and that the ICC may validly 
consider Palestine to be a state for the purposes of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute and 
may accept the transfer of jurisdiction from the PA to the Court in line with the Statute 
and the principles of international law. At any rate, the decision of the OTP is not final as 
it will be subject to review by a Pre Trial Chamber, at which point the Court itself can 
rule on the validity of the acceptance of the declaration, a factor which should encourage 
the Prosecutor to take this essential step. 
 
45. Al-Haq submits this position paper for consideration of what are pressing and critical 
issues. We trust that an expeditious decision re the Palestinian declaration will be made 
taking these conclusions into account and indicate our willingness to assist and support 
the Court in its work in any way that we can. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
